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INTRODUCTION
Although women have fifty percent of the managerial positions in
large corporations in the United States,' the number of women CEOs
and directors is low and progress is stalled.' Many scholars maintain
that we should promote women executives so they will acquire experi-
ence, not because they will transform corporate decisionmaking.
Under this view, one should not classify a corporate actor as a woman,
but as a manager who happens to be a woman. Alternatively, some
researchers assert that women's "outsider" status increases corporate
accountability because they bring distinct moral perspectives to busi-
ness decisions. This Article seeks to bridge efforts to advance women
to upper-level management and attempts to foster more ethical corpo-
rate cultures.' Traditionally, corporate law scholars have not ex-
amined issues involving gender. Social psychology, however, has
produced many studies that use gender as a lens to analyze organiza-
1. CATALYST INC., 2002 CATALYST CENSUS OF WOMEN CORPORATE OFFICERS AND Top
EARNERS OF THE FORTUNE 500, at 16 fig.lI (2002).
2. Id. at 3 figs.1, 2; CATALYST INC., 2003 CATALYST CENSUS OF WOMEN BOARD DIRECTORS
5 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 CATALYST CENSUS].
3. This Article follows the lead of Susan Sturm's approach to connecting conversa-
tions about race, class, and gender to broader inquiries about the law in general. Specifi-
cally, Sturm seeks to eliminate "second generation," or more subtle forms of
discrimination against women by analyzing norms in corporate cultures. See, e.g., Susan P.
Sturm, From Gladiators to Problem-Solvers: Connecting Conversations About Women, the Academy,
and the Legal Profession, 4 DUKEJ. GENDER L. & POL'Y 119 (1997); Susan Sturm, Second Gener-
ation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001)
[hereinafter Sturm, Employment Discrimination]. This Article also builds on the foundation
established by Donald Langevoort in examining how corporate cultures foster behavioral
biases that lead to unethical behaviors in corporations. See infra Part III.A.2.
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tional behavior.4 This Article examines how societal norms restrict
both men and women to avoid a one-sided analysis that limits the use
of gender as an analytical tool.5
We need to acknowledge, at the outset, several limitations of this
inquiry. Most importantly, social psychology often uses broad lan-
guage to talk about gender differences, but these generalizations do
not characterize many men and women. Therefore, we should use
caution in interpreting these findings in a manner that perpetuates
stereotypes. In addition, this research field relies upon laboratory ex-
periments that may not simulate real-world settings-especially the
high-pressure environment of the marketplace. The results of gender
testing in social psychology have produced a contentious debate-
with few hard facts. With these distinctions in mind, as corporate law
scholars, we can gain insights from social psychology to develop theo-
ries concerning gender and corporate governance.
This Article questions the view of many theorists that women have
a "different voice" that involves an "ethic of care"-a moral authority
not possessed by men.6 Under this notion, since women are not one
of the "good ole boys," they may have a greater tendency to detect
wrongdoing and speak out when necessary.7 In contrast, some schol-
ars assert that businesswomen can cross unethical boundaries along-
side men. The evidence, however, is mixed as to whether men and
women differ in terms of their underlying approaches to questionable
decisions.
Researchers posit that corporate cultures may influence business
integrity through promotion tournaments whereby employees battle
in attempts to defeat each other in order to rise to higher levels of
management. Some of these tournaments foster "gladiator" environ-
ments whereby some of the winners, labeled "superstars," may have an
over-optimism bias that can lead to excessive risk-taking and even
fraudulent conduct.' Researchers assert that these executives are nar-
cissistic individuals with "big egos."
4. For a discussion of social psychology in general, see infra text accompanying notes
133-134 and 161-175. Several corporate scholars have used social psychology to study cor-
porate law. See infra Part II.A.
5. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
6. Marleen A. O'Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REv.
1233, 1307-08 (2003).
7. Id. at 1307.
8. See infra Part III.A.3.a. For an overview of issues pertaining to corporate morality,
see Donald C. Langevoort, Ego, Human Behavior, and Law, 81 VA. L. REv. 853 (1995) [here-
inafter Langevoort, Ego] and Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory
of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L.
REv. 101 (1997) [hereinafter Langevoort, Organized Illusions].
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This Article maintains that, while women executives' behavioral
traits may foster honesty in the workplace, it is more important to em-
phasize how these cognitive differences also impede women's progress
in climbing the corporate ladder. In general, businesswomen must
master a high-wire act that maneuvers around the "double bind"-a
woman executive cannot be too masculine or feminine. This Article
explores three difficulties of this gender performance that may hinder
women's executive elevation in tournament structures.9 First, studies
show that many women are inclined to lack self-confidence and the
propensity to take risks, especially for those activities strongly identi-
fied with men-such as business careers. Second, while many men
are apt to engage in direct conflict, women tend to use covert forms of
hostility. Finally, whereas men often receive rewards for boasting
about their successes, women frequently downplay their talents be-
cause they may face penalties for touting their achievements.
Part I reviews the current status of women directors and high-
level executives. This Part rejects the most common reason given by
CEOs for the lack of women directors-there are not enough women
in the "pipeline." Next, this Part questions the effectiveness of strate-
gies that emphasize that women in senior management will improve
firm profitability. Although the business case is one way to debate
these issues, the adoption of this market approach has several disad-
vantages that should be recognized. Specifically, the findings to sup-
port the business case are inconclusive and opponents can make
several arguments to refute this theory.
Part II examines the ongoing debate between supporters and crit-
ics of the ethic of care theory. This Part examines the impact of gen-
der-based behavioral dynamics-stereotypes, leadership styles, as well
as differing male and female attitudes toward direct conflict-on wo-
men's advancement opportunities. This Part focuses on new research
maintaining that aspects concerning women's ethic of care may, in-
deed, hinder their accomplishments. Specifically, women may have
(1) the proclivity not to ask for raises and promotions and (2) the
tendency to show aggression in hidden ways.
Part III examines how gender dynamics influence corporate gov-
ernance concerns about tournaments and boardroom cultures. This
Part concludes that several factors indicate that women may be even
less likely than men to prevent corrupt conduct.
This Article questions the strategy that seeks to encourage women
executives by emphasizing that this will bring an ethic of care to cor-
9. See infra Part III.A.3.a.
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porate governance. Rather, we need to analyze in more detail the
underlying reasons why women do not fare well in narcissistic work-
places. This Article asserts that we should eliminate barriers to wo-
men executives' achievement regardless of whether these efforts
improve firm profitability or ethical corporate cultures. Specifically,
women's ascension to senior management is in and of itself a legiti-
macy issue for the corporation's role in society.
I. WOMEN EXECUTIVES: THE PIPELINE ARGUMENT AND THE
BUSINESS CASE
This Part examines data about women directors in more detail
and analyzes the argument that there are not enough women in the
pipeline to invite to corporate boards. Next, this Part considers the
business case which espouses that diversity increases shareholder
value.
A. Status of Women Managers on Corporate Boards
Corporate boards of the largest companies consist mostly of white
males, in their mid-fifties, who are predominately Protestant and Re-
publican.1 ° Catalyst, a nonprofit research firm, reports that women
hold approximately 13.6% of Fortune 500 board seats." In addition,
Catalyst reveals that 10.8% of the Fortune 500 have no women direc-
tors and 41.6% of these firms have only one female director.' 2 For
these leading companies, only two boards had a majority of women.1 3
In addition, Catalyst acknowledges that the percentage of women
on Fortune 500 boards reached the 10% milestone in 1996, although
nearly 20% still had no women on their boards.14 In the last four
10. James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations
and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAw. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 106 (1985); see
also James D. Wesphal & Edward J. Zajac, Who Shall Govern? CEO/Board Power, Demographic
Similarity, and New Directors Selection, 40 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 60 (1995) (discussing corporate di-
rectors and CEOs' preference for selecting individuals of similar demographics).
11. 2003 CATALYST CENSUS, supra note 2, at 5; see also Kimberly Weisul, Make Way for
Madame Director: Corporate Reform Is Creating Unexpected Openings for Women in the Boardroom,
Bus. WK., Dec. 22, 2003, at 57 (noting women's presence in 13.6% of board seats).
12. 2003 CATALYST CENSUS, supra note 2, at 6 fig.2; see also Patricia M. Flynn & Susan M.
Adams, Changes Will Bring More Women to Boards, 20 FIN. EXECUTIVE, Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 34
tbl.2 (stating that 10.8% of Fortune 500 firms have zero female directors).
13. 2003 CATALYST CENSUS, supra note 2, at app. 1 (Avon Prods., Inc. & Golden W. Fin.
Corp.); see also Patricia Kitchen, Corporate Boards Still Lack Women, NEWSDAY, Dec. 4, 2003, at
A7 (noting that among New York-based companies, only Avon had a board made up of a
majority of women).
14. Judith H. Dobrzynski, Women Pass Milestone in the Board Room, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12,
1996, at D4.
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years, the number of women directors has only increased 2.4%.15 At
this rate of progress, women will not achieve parity with men on For-
tune 500 boards until the year 2064.16 These figures are not limited to
the United States; in all parts of the world, the percentages of female
senior executives, especially female CEOs, are low for large
corporations.'
7
Women directors are not as likely as men to serve on the impor-
tant committees of boards such as auditing, nominating, and compen-
sation committees.18 Women directors, however, are more likely to
serve on corporate social responsibility committees.19 An interesting
question arises as to whether this results from women directors being
associated with committees that have the feminine characteristics of
care.
20
Variances between men and women directors exist depending on
whether they are inside or outside directors. With respect to inside
directors, compared to men,.women have similar qualifications. 21 Yet,
these women hold less powerful corporate titles and earn considerably
less.22 With respect to outside directors, more women than men hold
these positions. 2' These women are more likely to have nonbusiness
backgrounds and to hold advanced degrees. 24 These women sit on as
many boards as independent directors who are men and are selected
to subsequent boards at a faster pace.25
15. 2003 CATALYST CENSUS, supra note 2, at 5 tbl.1.
16. Margaret Steen, How Soon Will Women Gain More Corporate Directorships, and
Will It Make a Difference?, FAST TRACK, Aug. 25, 2004, http://www.infoworld.com/cgi-
bin/displayStat.nl?/pageone/news/features/fastrack/99ft.bo.
17. Judith G. Oakley, Gender-Based Barriers to Senior Management Positions: Understanding
the Scarcity of Female CEOs, 27 J. Bus. ETHICS 321, 321 (2000).
18. Diana Bilimoria & Sandy Kristin Piderit, Board Committee Membership: Effects of Sex-
Based Bias, 37 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1453, 1469 (1994).
19. CAROLYN KAY BRANCATO & D. JEANNE PATTERSON, The Conference Bd., Board Diver-
sity in U.S. Corporations: Best Practices for Broadening the Profile of Corporate Boards 30
(1999).
20. In addition, these committees do not promote women's careers as much because
they are less likely to enhance ability to network with "higher status" colleagues. Id. at 31.
21. Deborah Dahlen Zelechowski & Diana Bilimoria, Characteristics of Women and Men
Corporate Inside Directors in the US, 12 CoRe. GOVERNANCE: INT'L REv. 337, 337 (2004).
22. Oakley, supra note 17, at 324 (noting that for Fortune 500 senior officers, the aver-
age cash compensation is $765,000 for men, and $518,596 for women; thus women senior
officers earn sixty-eight cents for every dollar earned by men).
23. See Susan L. Williams, Investor Responsibility Research Ctr., Diversity on Corporate
Boards, June 2004 (on file with author) (observing that eighty-six percent of female direc-
tors were independent).
24. AmyJ. Hillman et al., Women and Racial Minorities in the Boardroom: How Do Directors
Differ?, 28 J. MGMT. 747, 758 (2002).
25. Id. at 759.
[VOL. 65:465
2006] WOMEN EXECUTIVES IN GLADIATOR CORPORATE CULTURES 471
The status of women directors differs depending on regional and
market considerations. As far as regional considerations, in the sec-
ond tier of the Fortune 1000, each region had a "significant drop in
the share of women board members"-more than twenty-five percent
have no women.26 As far as different markets, public utilities, finan-
cial services, and insurance industries tend to be among the sectors
with the highest percentage of companies having women directors.27
"In contrast, the technology and. manufacturing/industrial sectors
have many companies with no women directors." 2' Further, only
eighteen percent of dot-coin companies have at least one woman di-
rector and just three percent of directors of these Internet companies
are women. 29 Surprisingly, companies with few or no women direc-
tors operate in markets where women are the major customers and
employees. 0
B. The Pipeline Debate over Women's Access to Boards
One of the most common reasons given by CEOs for the lack of
women directors is that there are not enough women in the "pipe-
line."31 Specifically, in a Catalyst survey of Fortune 1000 CEOs, sixty-
eight percent of male CEOs stated that lack of experience holds wo-
men back.32 Many directors of companies are CEOs of other compa-
nies, but this limits the number of women in the pipeline, since only
eight of the Fortune 500 CEOs are female."
Specifically, CEOs generally state that they have a hard time iden-
tifying female candidates. 4 Women executives, however, complain
that the insider mentality of the corporate world leads to limited ad-
vertising about board vacancies. When positions become open, how-
ever, nominating committees may picture the number of eligible
women as low because many have not had board seats, and those that
do tend to serve on several boards. In this light, the belief that there
are enough qualified women to appoint has some validity. In contrast
to this view, the Conference Board, a research center, suggests that
26. Flynn & Adams, supra note 12, at 34 & tbl.2.
27. Id. at 34-35.
28. Id. at 35.
29. INTERNET BD. INDEX, A REPORT ON 200 PUBLICLY TRADED COMPANIES 7 (2000).
30. Flynn & Adams, supra note 12, at 35.
31. See, e.g., Diana Bilimoria, Women Directors: The Quiet Discrimination, 16 CORP. BOARD,
July-Aug. 1995, at 10, 11.
32. CATALYST INC., WOMEN IN U.S. CORPORATE LEADERSHIP: 2003, at 24-25 (2003).
33. Bruce Meyerson, All Business: Can't Find 'Qualified' Directors? Look Harder, COLUM-
BIAN (Wash.), July 21, 2004, at E2.
34. Bilimoria, supra note 31, at 11.
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nominating committees need to use a broader lens in choosing direc-
tors.35 That is, many qualified women are "in the pipeline" for board
service because they have experience as chief financial officers, chief
operating officers, general counsels, and heads of corporate divi-
sions.6 In this way, the traditional "ole boys' network" may give way to
searching beyond the power elite to include others with different
views.
As the demands upon directors increase, the pool of candidates
decreases because members may perceive the time commitments and
legal risks of board service as too demanding.37 Specifically, "[w]here
board members used to devote about 150 hours a year to the job of
being a director, the average has risen to 250 hours per year ... 8
In addition to new duties, the increased legal liabilities faced by direc-
tors may decrease the existing pool. Specifically, legal liability has
risen because shareholders are bringing suit for directors' lack of
"good faith." Historically, in times of a shortage of independent direc-
tors, women's chances of obtaining board seats improve. Since the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act demands more "independent thinkers," the hope
is that nominating committees will search for a more diverse group of
candidates.39
In a 1996 study, Catalyst reported that senior women executives
and men CEOs differed over the question why so few women are as-
cending to senior leadership positions. When asked if there had been
great improvements over the previous five years, forty-nine percent of
the men, versus twenty-three percent of the women responded affirm-
35. BRANCATO & PATrERSON, supra note 19, at 21.
36. Press Release, Catalyst Inc., Catalyst Census Marks Gains in Numbers of Women
Corporate Officers in America's Largest 500 Companies (Nov. 19, 2002), available at http:/
/www.catalyst.org/pressroom/press-releases/2002_cote.htm; see Rob Norton, Where to Find
New Directors, CoRP. BOARD MEMBER MAG., May-June 2003, available at http://www.board
member.com/network/index.pl?section=1019&articleid=&show=article (noting that indi-
viduals in these positions are being increasingly considered for directorships).
37. See Susan Stellin, Executive Life; Directors Ponder New, Tougher Roles, N.Y. TIMES, June
30, 2002, § 3, at 16; see also The Fading Appeal of the Boardroom, ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 2001, at
67; Meyerson, supra note 33, at E2 (noting the common complaint that the supply of quali-
fied applicants is too small to satisfy the demands of directors in light of the concerns over
legal risks and recommending that more consideration be given to women applicants to fill
this demand).
38. Meyerson, supra note 33, at E2.
39. E.g., Kitchen, supra note 13, at A7; Meyerson, supra note 33, at E2; Kelly Pate, Corpo-
rate Woes Spell Opportunity for Women, DENVER POST, Aug. 2, 2002, at Cl; Stellin, supra note
37, at 16; Mary Williams Walsh, Preparing a Corps of Women for Corporate Responsibility, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 13, 2002, at Cl.
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atively.4 ° When questioned about these barriers, the study revealed
that more women executives suggested that male stereotyping (fifty-
two percent women and twenty-five percent men)41 and exclusion
from informal networks (forty-nine percent women and fifteen per-
cent men)42 were the reasons why women had not risen higher in the
corporate ranks. Interestingly, while male senior executives and wo-
men both perceived the need for organizations to change to include
women (sixty-eight percent women and eighty percent men),43 more
women than men thought they also needed to share responsibility in
adapting to corporate cultures (seventy-three percent women and
sixty-one percent men)."
C. The Business Case for Promoting Women Executives
1. Presenting the Business Case.-Given the demands of a market-
driven culture, proponents seeking to improve the status of women
executives often turn to the rhetoric of economics-the so-called busi-
ness case for promoting women.45 Under this view, increasing the
number of women in senior management is not just a moral impera-
tive, it makes good business sense. Ultimately, advancing women to
upper management will increase shareholder value. Many of these
studies show that firms can increase profitability by maximizing the
returns invested in women's human capital by reducing hiring costs
and turnover.46 Other surveys emphasize that women score higher
than men in many indices of top leadership, including those related
to profitability.47 Specifically, women managers performed better
than men on giving feedback, rewarding and motivating individuals
and teams, and acting with integrity.4" Women also scored higher
than men on maintaining productivity, producing quality work, meet-
40. CATALYST INC., WOMEN IN CORPORATE LEADERSHIP: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 76
(1996).
41. Id at 37 tbl.4.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 62.
44. Id.
45. Steven A. Ramirez, Diversity and the Boardroom, 6 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 85, 90-109
(2000). For an in-depth critique of the dangers of shareholder value maximization, see
LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY (2001).
46. E.g., Ramirez, supra note 45, at 96.
47. Deborah M. Merrill-Sands & Deborah M. Kolb, Women as Leaders: The Paradox of
Success, CGO INSIGHTS, April 2001, at 1, available at http://www.simmons.edu/som/docs/
centers/insigh ts_9.pdf.
48. Id. at 1-2.
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ing project deadlines, generating new ideas, and moving projects
forward.4 9
Other theorists emphasize that the additional experience and
knowledge bases brought by women managers will increase the bot-
tom line.50 To support this view, some studies show that more women
executives than men have the interpersonal skills commonly associ-
ated with feminine styles of management-relational approaches,
rather than confrontational tactics-that are important in organiza-
tions which stress customer service.
Efforts to promote women to higher corporate levels use two
other bottom-line considerations. Some corporations consider the
notion of "market reciprocity," if women make up half of the con-
sumer base of a corporation, then top management should have pro-
portional representation.5" Second, some firms place women on their
boards for a less virtuous reason: as a method to mitigate against dis-
crimination litigation as well as criticism by unions, politicians, and
the media.52
To support the business case, Catalyst emphasizes findings that
"companies with a higher percentage of women in senior-level posi-
tions have better returns."53 In addition, the Conference Board finds
it noteworthy that the Fortune 10 companies ranked highest in profit-
ability all have a woman on their boards, and seven out of these ten
have more than one woman on their boards.54
2. Refuting the Business Case.-Three arguments can be made
against the business case. First, given the increasing pressure from
markets, caring dimensions of management will be marginalized by
considerations of efficiency. That is, emotional considerations are not
part of the corporate experience because the culture needs to be ad-
49. Id.
50. BRANCATO & PATTERSON, supra note 19, at 7-8; see also Steen, supra note 16 (noting
that having women on a board will not substantially change boards; however, it does make
a difference for women directors because they get the experience that comes with being a
board member).
51. BRANCATTO & PATTERSON, supra note 19, at 8; O'Connor, supra note 6, at 1308.
52. BRANcA-ro & PATrERSON, supra note 19, at 9. See generally Ira Millstein, Tough Cor-
porate Reforms Are Still Being Dodged, FIN. TIMES, July 6, 2004, at 19.
53. Andrea L. Stape, Chairwoman of Deloitte & Touche's U.S. Board Says Diversity Is Key,
KNIGHT RIDDER/TRIB. Bus. NEWS, Mar. 18, 2004. Companies with the highest representa-
tion of women in executive-level positions have a twenty-four percent higher total share-
holder return. Id.
54. J. Veronica Biggins, Making Board Diversity Work, CORP. BOARD, July-Aug. 1999, at 11.
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versarial and opportunistic to meet competitive demands. 55 In a simi-
lar view, even if women have higher moral tendencies when they join
corporations, they will not last because occupational experiences will
override socialized gender roles.56 This view emphasizes that women
assimilate to the prevailing norms and requirements of organizational
life. To succeed, women may experience changes in their psychologi-
cal makeups by going through socially institutionalized rites of pas-
sage.57 In the end, rather than women changing corporations, one
can argue that corporations are more likely to change women. Re-
lated to this position, if women executives spend time doing emo-
tional work for team building, they are unlikely to receive credit
because promotions are based upon bottom-line results. That is,
these behind-the-scenes helpers do not become leaders.
Second, even if businesses are making a move away from adver-
sarial to cooperative management styles, this may be a response to de-
mands in the marketplace, rather than to women's influence upon
corporate cultures. If this is the case, one can reject the notion that
women's feminine characteristics predispose women to this leadership
style. Additionally, if these market conditions give women with caring
values an edge in the tournament, men will quickly learn these behav-
iors to beat the competition to proceed to the next round.
Finally, corporate law scholars maintain that firms that engage in
gender discrimination may nevertheless succeed in the marketplace.
Specifically, these firms may not face market penalties if other firms
also employ similar practices. 8
55. See generally E. Sharon Mason & Peter E. Mudrack, Gender and Ethical Orientation: A
Test of Gender and Occupational Socialization Theories, 15 J. Bus. ETHics 599 (1996) (demon-
strating that women become more ethical than men once they enter the workforce but not
before).
56. Robbin Derry, An Empirical Study of Moral Reasoning Among Managers, 8 J. Bus. ETH-
ics 855, 860 (1989).
57. Hilary Sommerlad, Can Women Lawyer Differently? A Perspective from the UK in Wo-
MEN IN THE WORLD'S LEGAL PROFESSIONS 191, 197 (Ulrike Schultz & Gisela Shaw eds.,
2003).
58. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Overcoming Resistance to Diversity in the Executive
Suite: Grease, Grit, and the Corporate Promotion Tournament, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1615,
1622-23 (2004) [hereinafter Grease and Grit] (discussing how discriminating firms can con-
tinue to be competitive in the marketplace); David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are
There So Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms? An Institutional Analysis, 84 CAL. L. REV.
493, 496 (1996) (discussing the lack of black lawyers in corporate law firms and how those
firms' recruiting practices prevent them from facing competitive disadvantages). Cf David
B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers: Tracking Seeding and
Information Control in the Internal Labor Markets of Elite Law Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1581, 1581-
91 (1998) (discussing the promotional model of elite law firms); Meyerson, supra note 33,
at E2 (noting the significant pool of women corporate officers who have been largely ig-
nored by Fortune 500 companies when selecting board members).
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Although the business case is one way to debate these issues, the
adoption of this market approach has several disadvantages that
should be recognized. Conservative members of management may
not be persuaded by arguments to promote women in the absence of
solid data that this policy will increase stock prices. 59 Thus, the busi-
ness case is unlikely to bring about changes because it is empirically
fragile. In addition, if women executives are viewed as costly to main-
tain or regarded as interfering with cultures, the rationale for the busi-
ness case does not stand.
D. Shareholder Proposals Recommending Diversity
To satisfy their fiduciary duties to their beneficiaries, large institu-
tional investors have been strong proponents of the business case in
their efforts to promote women managers in large corporations.6" In
the past, activists who filed shareholder resolutions for diversity were
limited to groups formed for the purpose of increasing corporate so-
cial responsibility. Recently, institutional shareholders who tradition-
ally restricted their reform efforts to more conventional corporate
governance concerns-such as board independence and executive
compensation-have joined these efforts to promote diversity.6'
Shareholder resolutions recommending diversity on boards receive
high levels of approval among the social policy resolutions-on aver-
age twenty percent.
62
II. EXAMINING WOMEN'S "OUTSIDER" VOICE IN
CoRPoRATE GOVERNANCE
This Part provides an overview of the argument that women have
an ethic of care that leads to a higher moral sense. With this back-
59. Grease and Grit, supra note 58, at 1634.
60. See William Baue, Connecticut Initiative Promotes a Better Bottom Line Through Diverse
Boards, SOClALFUNDS.COM, Nov. 5, 2002, http://www.socialfunds.com/news/article.cgi/ar-
ticle959.html (discussing the Connecticut Board Diversity initiative and its belief that ad-
ding diversity to the boardroom impacts the "bottom line").
61. The convergence of these two groups focuses on common concerns involving sev-
eral "cross over" issues that view corporate social responsibility as means to improve corpo-
rate governance practices. Carolyn Brancato suggests that institutional shareholders are
entering a new stage of activism to consider issues previously thought of as promoting
corporate social responsibility. CAROLYN KAY BRANCATO, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 87 (1997). For example, CaIPERS recently pulled its investments
from several Asian countries based on their failure to meet CalPERS's standards for labor
practices. James McRitchie, Editor, The Corporate Governance.Net, Address at the Forum
on Corporate Governance in Asia (May 11, 2002), http://www.corpgov.net/forums/com-
mentary/post-enron.html.
62. Williams, supra note 23.
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ground, this Part seeks to contribute to corporate law scholarship by
examining gender based behavioral dynamics for men and women
concerning (1) business ethics, (2) competitive attitudes in negotia-
tions, (3) leadership styles, and (4) aggressive tendencies. Although
the literature posits that women may have lower egos that lead to less
risk-taking, the reasons underlying these tendencies must be ex-
amined before we can conclude that they may make a difference in
corporate governance.63
A. Overview of Gender Analysis
This Article maintains that corporate scholars should analyze gen-
der issues because understanding the nature of human beings is es-
sential in setting research agendas and informing research methods.6 4
Given everyday opinions about gender issues, corporate scholars need
63. The scope of this Article does not allow for discussion of many views concerning
the most appropriate way to look at gender. See, e.g., Kellye Y. Testy, Linking Progressive
Corporate Law with Progressive Social Movements, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1227 (2002). While this
Article focuses on gender, it hopes to continue a conversation that will lead to considera-
tions of race, class, sexual orientation, and disability. These different perspectives should
be evaluated separately as distinct categories, as well as together. Analysis of the common
ground shared by these different considerations-intersectionality-is needed to gain a
fuller perspective on how many "outsider" voices influence corporate governance matters.
Corporate scholars are beginning to explore these issues in more detail. In addition
to the other articles in this Symposium on Women and the "New" Corporate Governance, see
Symposium, People of Color, Women, and the Public Corporation, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 887
(2005). This Article builds on several articles by corporate governance scholars using race
and gender. See, e.g., Terry O'Neill, The Patriarchal Meaning of Contract: Feminist Reflections
on the Corporate Governance Debate, in PERSPECTIVES ON COMPANY LAw 2, at 27 (Fiona Macmil-
lan Patfield ed., 1997); Ronnie Cohen, Feminist Thought and Corporate Law: It's Time to Find
Our Way up from the Bottom (Line), 2 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1994); Theresa A. Gabaldon,
Assumptions About Relationships Reflected in the Federal Securities Laws, 17 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J.
215 (2002); Theresa A. Gabaldon, Corporate Conscience and the White Man's Burden, 70 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 944 (2002); Theresa A. Gabaldon, Feminism, Fairness, and Fiduciary Duty in
Corporate and Securities Law, 5 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 1 (1995); Theresa A. Gabaldon, The
Lemonade Stand: Feminist and Other Reflections on the Limited Liability of Corporate Shareholders,
45 VAND. L. REV. 1387 (1992); Faith Stevelman Kahn, Legislatures, Courts and the SEC: Reflec-
tions on Silence and Power in Corporate and Securities Law, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1107 (1997);
Janis Sarra, The Gender Implications of Corporate Governance Change, 1 SEATTLE J. FOR Soc.
JUST. 457 (2002); Cheryl L. Wade, The Impact of U.S. Corporate Policy on Women and People of
Color, 7J. GENDER RACE &JUST. 213 (2003).
Martha Fineman, a leading feminist scholar, has had several workshops on a Feminist
Analysis of Corporations and Capitalism. For an overview of these proceedings, see Janis
Sarra, Martha's Garden, Cultivating and Nurturing Alternative Visions of Corporate Law
Through the Feminism and Legal Theory Workshop, May 12, 2005 (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author).
For corporate scholarship advocating diversity to break groupthink, see Ramirez, supra
note 45, at 86.
64. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DE-
VELOPMENT 173 (1982) ("[W]e have listened for centuries to the voices of men ... so we
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to move beyond the rational actor model 65 to explore perceptions of
femininity and masculinity because many aspects of our social world
are governed by these types of thinking. In this way, the perennial
debate about these differences can aid our understanding of what
men and women bring to corporate cultures. To explore these com-
mon beliefs, this Article turns to social construction theory to consider
how gender ideologies arise from societal forces and strong cultural
norms. Specifically, gender stereotypes act to pull men and women in
the direction of conventional behavior.66 That is, society enforces
gender codes by sanctioning those who do not act according to tradi-
tional roles.
Gender roles are malleable over time and have undergone
profound change in the last thirty years.67 At the same time, such
roles are slow to change. Although men deal with women on a profes-
sional level, perceptions about other women in their lives who may
follow traditional roles-such as wives, daughters, or mothers-may
spillover to the workplace.68 Because of these conflicting gender
roles, women executives may have a more difficult time building rela-
tionships with businessmen.
Much discourse on promoting broader gender norms is, by its
nature, inherently contradictory within itself. While this analysis
warns against stereotyping, it distinguishes separate world experiences
for men and women. Recognizing these mixed messages, this Article
explores these essentialist theories to provide a broad-brush perspec-
tive to consider questions about gender and corporate governance
one step at a time.
have come more recently to notice not only the silence of women but the difficulty in
hearing what they say when they speak.").
65. Corporate law scholarship has been dominated by economics, restricting how this
literature views human nature. See Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgement
and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1499, 1526
(1998) [hereinafter Behavioral Theories] (considering whether law and economics theory is
influential "because its central rhetorical construct of rational man evokes an image of an
institutionally controlled (and controllable) world" and "because the image of the rational
actor as the ideal-type in the prevailing social structure reflects the egocentric self-image of
judges and lawyers").
66. JOAN WILLIAMS, UNbending Gender 246 (2000).
67. Of course, women have always worked. Yet, women pursuing high-powered careers
and combining these careers with motherhood is a new phenomena. Specifically, the
baby-boom generation was the first to delay childbearing to pursue work outside the home.
This is not to say that women have not had an influence on societies through their care
labor; after all, one can view the "hand that rocks the cradle" as the "hand that rules the
world."
68. Oakley, supra note 17, at 328.
[VOL. 65:465
2006] WOMEN EXECUTIVES IN GLADIATOR CORPORATE CULTURES 479
At the outset, we need to emphasize that men have gender too. A
new area of "men's studies" has arisen to better understand prevailing
notions of masculinity.69 Men also face changing gender patterns.
Under traditional gender norms, men face great pressure to succeed
and gain status as the family breadwinner. 7' Although this conven-
tional view remains, shifting norms lead to confusion over what it
means to be a man today.71 Specifically, men also face the double
bind-if they show sensitivity they are wimps, but if they show tough-
ness they are criticized as insensitive. 72 Accordingly, men may have
less room for acceptable gender performance than women; that is,
women face less criticism for adopting traditional male behavior than
men expressing feminine traits.
Gender perspectives allow us to see that corporations are male
institutions. Specifically, Catalyst emphasizes that gender differences
arise because corporate environments were designed by and for men
and presumably geared toward their behavior and responsive to their
69. See, e.g., SUsAN FALUDI, STIFFED: THE BETRAYAL OF THE AMERICAN MAN (1999); THE
GENDERED SOCIETY READER (Michael S. Kimmel ed., 2000); LIONEL TIGER, THE DECLINE OF
MALES (1999). This new field of research on "masculinities" directs us to consider men's
views of ambition and aggression and how these factors play out in men's organizational
experience. See infra notes 96-98, 133-144 and accompanying text. In addition, this lens
allows us to consider how gender constrains men in their roles as breadwinners in the new
economy and as fathers in changing patterns of family life. See, e.g., Martin H. Malin, Fa-
thers and Parental Leave, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1047 (1994).
70. In contrast, other research posits that these obstacles to change should be in terms
of male supremacy and power. See, e.g., ANTHONY MCMAHON, TARING CARE OF MEN 174-75
(1999) (asserting that obstacles to change focused solely on sociological accounts of men's
family life neglects to include "power, male supremacy and agency"). Under these theories
about male supremacy-the main obstacle is the male psyche-men want to control wo-
men to bolster male egos. Id. at 34-35. White male power over women differs from other
forms of domination by race and class because it takes place in the context of intimate
relationships. See id. at 23-31 (discussing men's perceived right to leisure and service).
To provide evidence for this position, researchers emphasize many factors. This Arti-
cle mentions two. First, men's household labor has not increased since the early 1990s-
ten hours per week. Id at 13. Interestingly, this low contribution does not vary by race,
social class, and country. Id. at 12-13. Surprisingly, it also does not differ according to
women's level wage and the number of children. Id. Because there are few social sanc-
tions to enforce egalitarian marriages and praise for small contributions is relatively easy
for men to earn, men have little incentive to increase their efforts doing domestic chores.
Id. at 23-25.
Second, Sweden has significant incentives for men to take paternity leave, but few
fathers take advantages of these benefits. Id. at 171. Only fourteen percent of fathers take
the parental leave offered by legislation; fifty percent of fathers only take a few days follow-
ing the birth of a child. Id This is despite widespread advertising campaigns picturing
macho sports heroes with babies espousing the joys of parenting. It
71. Id. at 176.
72. Id.
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needs.73 Compared to corporations in social democracies, American
firms are more masculine because they emphasize shareholder value
and bottom-line norms to a greater degree."
B. Gender Differences in Business Ethics
Some efforts to reform corporate governance emphasize that wo-
men's feminine traits may increase corporate morality.7 5 Gender is-
sues in business ethics have been explored extensively outside the
corporate governance scholarship. The statistical findings are incon-
clusive, leading to much debate. This Article questions whether this
approach will be effective in leading to significant advancements for
the career tracks of women executives.76
Researchers suggest that gender influences the perceptions of
ethical transgression-evaluators tend to see women as less blamewor-
thy than men for the same immoral acts.77 Providing evidence on a
related issue, studies find that men commit more fraud at higher
amounts than women-$185,000 for men compared with $48,000 for
women.71 One can hypothesize that because more men hold high-
level positions that provide the potential to manipulate financial state-
ments, the relative level of fraud by women will rise when they reach
comparable positions of management. In this regard, it is noteworthy
that embezzlement by women has increased significantly in recent
years-80.5% between 1993 and 2002. 79
73. Cf CATALYST INC., supra note 32, at 16-19 (discussing the barriers to women's ad-
vancement including exclusion from informal networks and gender stereotyping).
74. See Amir N. Licht, The Mother of All Path Dependencies: Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory
of Corporate Governance Systems, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 147, 170-80 (2001) (evaluating how dif-
ferent corporate governance systems incorporate the masculine trait of "[v]aluing achieve-
ment, heroism, assertiveness, and material success versus relationships, modesty, caring for
the weak, and interpersonal harmony").
75. But see Robin R. Radtke, The Effects of Gender and Setting on Accountants' Ethically
Sensitive Decisions, 24J. Bus. ETHICS 299 (2000) (finding that male and female accountants
responded to ethically sensitive situations in similar manners); Stacy A. Teicher, Do Female
Execs Have Cleaner Hands ?, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, Mar. 15, 2004, at 14 (questioning the
common conception of women as an ethical force capable of improving corporate
practices).
76. See Morgan E. Forbes, Questioning Feminine Connection, 12 HYPATtA 140 (1997) (criti-
quing common assumptions about women).
77. See generally Karen J. Maher & Jeffrey J. Bailey, The Effects of Transgressor Sex on Judg-
ments of Unethical Behavior, 18 J. Bus. ETHICS 157 (1999) (describing the debate among
researchers and ultimately concluding that gender plays no role).
78. Teicher, supra note 75, at 14.
79. Id.
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C. Women Executives and the Ethic of Care
Many theoretical discussions of high-powered women in business
start with the philosophy developed by Carol Gilligan, a psycholo-
gist.8" Gilligan posits that women tend to exhibit a strong ethic of
care that provides women with the talent to speak in a "distinct moral
language of their own."8" Gilligan provides findings that varied with
the prevailing notions of morality espoused by Lawrence Kohlberg, a
psychologist who examined boys.8 2 In testing both girls and boys, Gil-
ligan found that more boys use justice reasoning that emphasizes val-
ues of personal autonomy and focuses upon rights and obligations.8 3
In contrast, Gilligan discovered that girls display a more relational
view that seeks to solve ethical issues in a manner that preserves rela-
tionships.8 4 Gilligan's interviews, however, may show that men often
have traits of care and compassion, while many women possess the
supposedly male language of rights.8 5
Using Gilligan's research,86 many scholars emphasize that the
ethic of care arises from societal expectations that women will devote
their lives to the needs of others and expend less energy on their own
desires.87 Under this perspective, men are primarily separate selves,
while women are more connected to other people. This view empha-
sizes that women bear most of the burden for the care of children,
husbands, elderly parents, and other family members.8 8
To explain this socialization divergence, researchers suggest that
distinct "self-schemas" influence the way men and women compre-
80. GILLIGAN, supra note 64, at 1-2. Gilligan maintains that young girls "run into a wall"
when they become adolescents because spirited girls are reminded to be ladies. Christo-
pher Lasch, Meeting at the Crossroads: Women's Psychology and Girls'Development, NEW REPUB-
LIC, Dec. 7, 1992, at 34. Specifically, Gilligan's study of girls seven to eighteen showed that
girls' voices become silenced. Id. This adolescent socializing suggests that girls' "'web of
relationships' can be suffocating, inhibiting, and oppressive." Id.
81. Lasch, supra note 80, at 34.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. GILLIGAN, supra note 64, at 65-66.
87. For analysis of this view, see LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON'T ASK:
NEGOTIATION AND THE GENDER DIVIDE 62-72 (2003).
88. "[E]ighty-five percent of women are mothers and young girls are socialized to be
mothers." Marleen O'Connor-Felman, American Corporate Governance and Children: Invest-
ing in Our Future Human Capital During Turbulent Times, 77 S. CAL. L. REv. 1255, 1272
(2004) (footnotes omitted). Some scholars espouse that mothers have particular instinc-
tual knowledge for caretaking given their greater investment in the reproduction process.
Gilligan, however, does not present the care perspective as biologically determined. See
GILLIGAN, supra note 64, at 67 (describing the moral decisionmaking of women in terms of
their choices).
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hend everyday life."° Under this view, gender serves as a filter
through which people receive knowledge and comprehend circum-
stances. In contrast to men, women tend to have the primary goal of
developing strong personal bonds. For this reason, upsetting this rela-
tionship harms women's self-regard more than it does men's.
These self-schemas develop because adults deal with male and fe-
male children in traditional ways.9 ° Although parents may take signifi-
cant steps to avoid these messages, children may subconsciously
absorb lessons about conventional roles for men and women. Re-
search shows that children start building gender schemas at a very
young age.91 Specifically, by age two, children recognize that occupa-
tions and domestic responsibilities are arranged by gender. 2 By age
six, they have sophisticated understandings of the extensive gender
signs they see on a daily basis.93 The result is that strong cultural sig-
nals teach children that men control much of the world.
D. Women's Hidden Aggression in Competitions
Some difference theorists emphasize that this childhood sociali-
zation results, in part, from distinctive styles of play for girls and boys.
Girls play in small groups where participants have equal status. In ad-
dition, girls offer courteous recommendations to support harmony
and will even end games to prevent hurt feelings. Furthermore, Gilli-
gan discovered that outspoken girls become timid during adolescence
in the hope of making themselves agreeable.94 In this light, Gilligan
emphasizes that this adolescent training to fit into "webs of relation-
ships" may stifle girls' authentic voices.95
Boys play in larger groups where games are rougher and more
competitive. Boys issue direct orders to one another in an atmos-
phere of conflict and struggle for dominance. Boys walk away from
arguments as friends, putting the fight behind them.96 Specifically,
when boys engage in friendly competition, researchers suggest that
"you know where you stand"-they fight and "have it be over with."97
89. BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, supra note 87, at 118-19.
90. Id, at 29.
91. Id. at 28.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Lasch, supra note 80, at 34.
95. Id.
96. RACHEL SIMMONS, ODD Girl Out: The Hidden Culture of Aggression in Girls 16
(2002).
97. Id.
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In contrast, recent theorists have begun to emphasize that girls
compete by different means than boys. Scholars suggest that girls' so-
cialization to "be nice" leads to undercover means of aggression.98
Young girls avoid overt acts of animosity because this behavior con-
flicts with traditional views about "good girls." To avoid sanctions, at a
young age, girls learn to manipulate emotions in relationships to in-
flict harm while maintaining the appearance of friendliness.99 Under
this bullying, the perpetrator conceals her intent to harass others by
using the cover of "it was just a joke." To acquire admiration, she
must invest as much energy appearing amicable as she devotes to exer-
cising animosity.1 °0 Starting in middle-school, "cliques" of girls form
that fight in popularity contests to gain superiority over low ranking
groups. To acquire social status and authority, girls learn to wear
masks of empathy to score points in the power ratings. In a paradoxi-
cal fashion, maintaining this false facade, girls need to avoid appear-
ing "conceited" because this conflicts with the view that they are
selfless. Indeed, one of the worst insults a girl can receive is that she
has a big ego, or she "thinks she's all that."101
Theorists suggest that girls' approach to expressing anger, domi-
nation, and conflict may carry over into the corporate world for wo-
men. 0 2 To support this idea, researchers assert that women who
climb to high levels of management withdraw from other women to
evade associations with those who do have the same power status. 10 3
Similarly, many career women perceive that successful women do not
spend much time mentoring other women.10 4 Given these factors,
women executives favor dealing with men because associations are
more transparent. 10 5
Girls' tendencies to engage in covert conflict also restrict their
ability as women to compete against men in tournaments. Under this
98. Id. at 6-7, 17-18.
99. Nicki R. Crick et al., Childhood Aggression and Gender: A New Look at an Old Problem, in
45 NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION: GENDER AND MOTIVATION 75, 95-98 (Dan Bern-
stein ed., 1999); see also PATRICIA A. ADLER & PETER ADLER, PEER POWER: PREADOLESCENT
CULTURE AND IDENTITY 56-73 (1998) (discussing the techniques used by children to create
and control "cliques" of friends).
100. Rachael Simmons states: "Covert aggression isn't just about not getting caught;
half of it is looking like you'd never mistreat someone in the first place." SIMMONS, supra
note 96, at 23.
101. Id. at 107.
102. Id. at 265.
103. Id. at 266.
104. SHEILA WELLINGTON, CATALYST INC., BE YOUR OWN MENTOR: STRATEGIES FROM Top
WOMEN ON THE SECRETS OF SUCCESS 163 (2001).
105. See SIMMONS, supra note 96, at 117 (discussing female duplicity).
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perspective, girls have fewer opportunities to engage in contests with
direct challenges. 11 6 In addition, women may receive social sanctions
for using straightforward styles of competitive behavior. Specifically,
studies show that many view assertiveness as a negative leadership trait
from women managers. Studies reveal that the same behavior by wo-
men is judged harshly as "boasting," but not when done by men.1"7
To succeed in general, women may avert the loss of male pride that
happens when men are "one upped by a girl." In some cases, women
executives seek training in order to avoid "scaring the boys"; they
learn to modify their aggressive behavior to appear nicer.108 For these
reasons, researchers assert that men's and women's different self-
schemas can have a profound impact on how they see conflicts over
status.' 0 9
E. The Double Bind Faced by Women Executives
Many scholars reject the ethic of care notion as a means of pro-
moting women executives because it reinforces stereotypes and leads
to the double bind. To support how this double bind impedes the
career success of women executives, these researchers emphasize ex-
periments that use the same resume, but change the gender of the
applicant. These tests revealed more favorable reviews, from both
men and women, for the male applicant over the female.110 These
scholars also point to examinations which show that, although women
executives perform according to the same objective criteria as men,
both men and women judge women's performance lower than
men's.11 Investigations reveal that when asked to evaluate personal
attributes of leaders, evaluators perceived women as more tempera-
mental and domineering, despite the fact that the performance of
men and women were similar. Surveys show that women in mixed
gender groups were most influential when they were "friendly, coop-
erative, confident, but nonconfrontational, and considerate." 12 Yet,
when questioned, participants stated that they did not have gender
biases. 1 13
106. See id. at 120 (observing that girls speak in code).
107. Id. at 106-07.
108. Neela Banerjee, Some "Bullies" Seek Ways to Soften Up: Toughness Has Risks for Women
Executives, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2001, at Cl.
109. BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, supra note 87, at 118-19.
110. WILLiaMS, supra note 66, at 248.
111. Id.
112. BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, supra note 87, at 105.
113. Id. at 90.
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Successful women managers may use the double bind to their ad-
vantage. This idea emphasizes "gender as performance," that is, wo-
men switch between a wide range of behaviors depending on the
context in which they are acting. Women play this complicated gen-
der game, not only to make life simpler, but to make progress in their
career tracks.114 Under this double bind, women learn when to em-
phasize gender differences and when to disguise them. If necessary,
women executives may put up a masculine front of toughness or use
the feminine face of caring. Viewed in this light, some business wo-
men may use common perceptions of moral authority to overcome
obstacles and gain prestige in the workplace.
F. Women Executives "Don't Ask" at the Bargaining Table
Scholars maintain that women's relational tendencies lead them
to ask for less at the bargaining table at work and at home.t 15 Since
more terms in the employment relationship are negotiable than in
the past, this is a serious impediment to women's success. Surveys re-
veal that almost eight times as many men than women asked for more
money when first obtaining jobs.116 Compared to men, women set
low goals and safe targets in managing their careers. Studies also indi-
cate that women do not take actions to obtain raises and promotions.
To explain, researchers maintain that powerful gender pressures re-
duce women's sense of personal entitlement. 7 For these reasons,
scholars suggest that women do not negotiate for more because they
tend to be satisfied with less than men."' Researchers provide three
reasons for this theory. First, women are not trained to measure their
time and talent in monetary ways since they are socialized to do caring
work at home.11 9 Second, both men and women disapprove of wo-
men behaving in competitive ways and impose societal sanctions for
114. Id. at 85.
115. Id. at 2-4.
116. Id. at 1.
117. Id. at 50-54 .
118. Id. at 4143.
119. Id. at 43. Most studies show that women tend to put more effort into their paid
employment than do men in comparable jobs, while also putting more effort into domestic
responsibilities. These research findings lead some scholars to maintain that men's success
in the labor market is based upon their reliance on women on the home front. This advan-
tage for men stems from the fact that men earn more than women, but it is also a cause of
women earning less in the workplace. See, e.g., Jane Waldfogel, The Effect of Children on
Women's Wages, 62 Am. Soc. REv. 209, 216 (1997) (hypothesizing that women with children
suffer a wage penalty); Jane Waldfogel, The Family Gap for Young Women in the United States
and Britain: Can Maternity Leave Make a Difference?, 16J. LAB. ECON. 505,507 (1998) (same).
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being too aggressive.1"' Finally, in entering the workplace, women
have faced decades of unfavorable labor market experiences. 21 Im-
portantly, the first step in not asking for a higher initial salary may
amount to approximately one million dollars on average by the time
many women retire.
Studies show that men are more optimistic-seeing many more
opportunities to negotiate. 122 Women, however, tend not to recog-
nize that circumstances can change if they bargain. Men's optimism
fosters more of a "can do" attitude leading to less vulnerability to neg-
ative feedback. 123 In contrast, the average women's feelings of self-
worth fluctuate more than men's-whether positive or negative.124
Due to this lack of self-confidence, women develop an "imposter syn-
drome," a sense of inadequacy that they are just "faking it," that is
objectively unfounded. 125 Women's lower sense of self-confidence
may lead women to engage in less risk-taking than men. Researchers
suggest that socialization may cause women to both recognize and
avoid more risk because they are more vulnerable overall. 126 Theorists
explain these findings by emphasizing that men have controlled wo-
men's lives until recently and still do to a large extent.
Men's greater sense of optimism about what is available gives
them an advantage over women at the negotiating table. Specifically,
men develop more aggressive targets, introduce higher offers, and
concede fewer points.1 27 Both men and women ask for higher offers
from women. 128 Men give more pressure to concede.' 29 That is, men
push risky positions in order to drive the other side to accept.' 0 Both
men and women demand more from women than they require from
men to agree to a bid.' In addition, men, for the most part, are less
likely to believe that disagreement about issues means that the conflict
between negotiators is personal.' 32
120. BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, supra note 87, at 62-63.
121. Id. at 49-50.
122. Id. at 19-20.
123. Id. at 52.
124. Id. at 51.
125. Id. at 77.
126. Id, at 136.
127. Id. at 135.
128. SaraJ. Solnick, Gender Differences in the Ultimatum Game, 39 ECON. INQUIRY 189, 190
(2001).
129. Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104
HABv. L. Rv. 817, 850 (1991).
130. BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, supra note 87, at 135.
131. Id. at 150 (42.5% larger on average).
132. Id. at 118-19.
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III. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: WOMEN, TOURNAMENTS,
AND GROUPTHINK
This Article emphasizes the need for open exploration of gender
stereotyping at the most senior levels within organizations. This Arti-
cle is not about ways to "fix" women so they can fit in. We should not
seek to "add women and stir" into corporate cultures. Admittedly, the
presence of more women in upper management is not a cure-all for
corporate governance problems. If more women ascended to the
highest positions of corporate authority, we do not know how they
would change business cultures. At the same time, changing corpo-
rate cultures will not eliminate gender biases.
Gender research, however, adds a richer view of corporate actors
by examining why and how these behavioral tendencies differ among
men and women. As this analysis unfolds, many scholars may find
reason to challenge these theories. In this way, this Article seeks to
invigorate debate about these fundamental questions of corporate
governance. This Article asserts that even though we do not have so-
lutions, we can make a contribution by asking questions. In this spirit,
we can speculate on theories suggesting how women executives may
foster ethical atmospheres or how gladiator workplaces may impede
women managers. Specifically, this Part examines how gender per-
spectives may influence two corporate governance issues: (1) promo-
tion tournaments and (2) groupthink.
A. Gender Differences in Tournament Structures
1. Social Psychology and Tournaments.-In general, social psychol-
ogy reveals good corporate actors can make bad decisions when
placed in certain situations.1 33 Even the finest managers may lack the
cognitive objectivity to review business decisions. These executives
may do so without shame because self-serving biases protect their self-
esteem.1 3 1 Societal and corporate norms promote these justifications
so that managers can continue to view themselves as honest.
2. Biases Fostered by Promotion Tournaments.-Firms seek to re-
duce monitoring expense by implementing evaluation systems to pro-
133. For an overview of this dynamic, see BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R.
Sunstein ed., 2000); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Behavioral Theories, supra note 65; Lynne A. Stout, In Praise of
Procedure: An Economic and Behavioral Defense of Smith v. Van Gorkom and the Business Judg-
ment Rule, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 675 (2002).
134. For an overview of issues pertaining to corporate morality, see, e.g., Langevoort,
Organized Illusion, supra note 8, at 107-09.
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mote a set number of employees based on their standings compared
to their colleagues. Although it is common for managers to use the
rhetoric of "team building," the tournament fosters a survival-of-the-
fittest or "gladiator"135 corporate culture. 136 The tournament struc-
ture requires players to continue to defeat opponents in successive
rounds. Winners receive high compensation and status; losers may
face termination. For some employees, this system offers thrilling ca-
reer opportunities; for others, the tournament contributes to anxiety-
ridden lives.
Success in one round does not mean success in higher rounds; as
the stakes increase so does the pressure. To remain "major players in
the game," the winners must continuously produce profits. The on-
going "what have you done for me lately?" pressures of competition
may lead superstars to fear that they may lose status. Social psycholo-
gists reveal that when people sense that they may forfeit benefits, they
may take more risks to maintain the rewards than they would to ac-
quire the reward in the first place, ignoring long-run regard for their
reputations.' 37 This is called a "loss frame."
In analyzing the behavioral biases of those who prosper in tourna-
ment contests, Donald Langevoort explains that superstars are "high-
ego" or "high-Mach" employees who may be highly narcissistic individ-
uals. 138 Successful people can become overconfident to the extent
that they do not see realistic boundaries to their power-the "winner's
curse."'t31 In this way, high-Mach types fail to perceive mistakes as at-
135. William Bratton used this term to refer to Enron's corporate culture while present-
ing his work at Tulane Law School in April, 2002. William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark
Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REv. 1275 (2002). For an analysis of the societal culture
that led to the Enron scandal, see Kent Greenfield, September 1lth and the End of History for
Corporate Law, 76 TUL. L. REv. 1409 (2002) and Faith Stevelman Kahn, Bombing Markets,
Subverting the Rule of Law: Enron, Financial Fraud, and September 11, 2001, 76 TUL. L. REV.
1579 (2002).
136. See, e.g., Langevoort, Ego, supra note 8, at 874-75. As an example, Enron used the
"rank and yank" system whereby workers evaluated each other; those falling at the bottom
of the curve were fired, while those at the top were given large bonuses. Under this peer-
review process, a group of twenty employees vote unanimously to judge Enron employees.
The top five percent ranked superior received bonuses sixty-six percent higher (and much
larger stock option grants) than those ranked excellent, the next thirty percent. See Beth-
any McLean, Why Enron Went Bust, FORTUNE, Dec. 24, 2001, at 58 (describing Enron's cul-
ture of arrogance and the techniques employed to maximize value).
137. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psy-
chology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981).
138. Donald C. Langevoort, The Organizational Psychology of Hyper-Competition: Corporate
Irresponsibility and the Lessons of Enron, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 968, 975 (2002); see also
Michael Maccoby, Narcissistic Leaders: The Incredible Pros, The Inevitable Cons, HARv. Bus.
REv., Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 69, 69.
139. RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE (1992).
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tributable to their actions.14° Specifically, self-serving biases may allow
the superstar to see hardship resulting from bad luck, but fortune
from exceptional talents. In addition, rather than modify plans when
a long-term project starts to flounder, these executives may throw
even more good money after bad. This cognitive bias is known as the
"optimism-commitment whipsaw"-whereby some executives disre-
gard red flags and deepen their investments.' With this perspective,
we can see how successful managers may get caught in an "encore
trap" in meeting analysts' forecasts for next quarter's profits.
In this way, Langevoort emphasizes that tournament structures
may defeat a firm's attempts to implement compliance programs to
ensure moral behavior.142 Facilitating these biases, Langevoort ex-
plains that firms using tournaments infuse their corporate atmo-
spheres with military and sports rhetoric to inculcate both
competitiveness and loyalty at the same time. Such metaphors allow
employees to see dishonest conduct as merely the type of combative
action needed to win the battle.143 An employee may come to view
corporate efforts to foster an ethical workplace as hypocritical given
tournament competition.
1 4 4
In struggling to ascend to higher rounds of the tournament con-
test, high-Mach types need to feel loyalty to team members when nec-
essary, but betray colleagues when the time comes. In other words,
high-Mach executives can sever ties of trust quickly by shutting down
their emotions. In this way, behavioral dissonance allows people to go
through these contests thinking little about what might be left behind
in order to succeed at any cost.
In choosing winners and losers in the tournament, managers
form beliefs about the integrity of a particular candidate-a heuristic
140. Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from Behavioral
Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. REv. 627, 664 (1996)
[hereinafter Selling Hope, Selling Risk] (noting that high-Mach types, who believe in which
they are selling will "experience the happy confluence of higher sales volume and lower
moral anxiety" despite their use of aggressive and manipulative sales tactics).
141. Langevoort, Organized Illusions, supra note 8, at 147.
142. Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance
with Law, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 71, 89-90.
143. See Donald C. Langevoort, Taking Myths Seriously: An Essay for Lawyers, 74 CHI.-KENT
L. REv. 1569, 1591-92 (2000) [hereinafter Taking Myths Seriously] (discussing the thought
process of junior attorneys).
144. Id. Yet, this explanation of how corporate cultures promote processes whereby cor-
porate actors rationalize away unethical actions does not mean that such actors should
necessarily be let off the hook for bad behavior. Rather, the goal is to shed light on the
powerful dynamics that flow from tournaments and the corporate cultures they create.
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device know as a "schema."'4 5 Specifically, once supervisors made a
commitment, they have a subconscious need to maintain consis-
tency.14 6 People tend to interpret new information in a manner to
confirm the status quo-"cognitive conservatism." 14 7 When they face
information that indicates that their initial decision was wrong, they
may fail to see these warning signs. Once the fraudulent behavior is
discovered, supervisors may be "surprised as anyone," not compre-
hending how they could let it happen.
3. Women's Cognitive Makeup and Tournaments.-
a. Impediments to Women's Success in Winning the Game.-Gen-
der research suggests that social stereotyping influences women's cog-
nitive makeups to impede their success in tournaments. Importantly,
women's minor missteps at the start can lead to major difficulties in
the long-run race. These subtle differences between men and women
are significant because minor setbacks can create a self-perpetuating
cycle that quickly accumulates. First, the tendency for women not to
ask for more money at the beginning of employment may foster biases
that they are worth less. 4 8 In formulating initial schemas of candi-
dates, supervisors tend to use higher salaries as evidence of greater
talent. Thus, women's salary differential may lead to low performance
evaluations for women in the early rounds of the competition. Thus,
men may proceed to higher rounds, in part, simply because they ask
for more money in the beginning.
Second, scholars examine gender differences in pyramid games
similar to tournaments. Laboratory studies using tournament struc-
tures tend to substantiate the position that supervisors give women
executives less challenging assignments based on unfounded assump-
tions. Researchers report that both men and women supervisors have
a tendency to grade women's performance lower based on the fact
that they are women.14 9 Specifically, these studies show that both wo-
men and men appraise men on their "potential" while women are
more commonly evaluated on their performance. The net result was
that managers promote men at a much faster rate than women.15 °
145. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lauryers? A Behavioral Inquiry into
Lawyers' Responsibility for Clients'Fraud, 46 VAND. L. Rav. 75, 98-99 (1993) [hereinafter Law-
yers' Responsibility].
146. See id. at 101 (discussing the need for schema consistency which requires ignoring
or rationalizing away contrary impressions).
147. Id. at 100.
148. BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, supra note 87, at 8-9.
149. WILLIAMS, supra note 66, at 248.
150. BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, supra note 87, at 15.
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Women's ability to ascend to higher rounds is also impeded because
more women tend not to market themselves to supervisors-believing
that hard work and talent alone are sufficient to climb the corporate
ladder.15 1
Studies also purport to demonstrate that men and women re-
spond differently to competitive environments depending on the gen-
der mix of the opposition. Men perform better when they compete
against women than against men. Indeed, the higher the proportion
of women among their challengers, the better men perform. Men's
accomplishments in all-male groups is the same as mixed-gender
groups, but women's success in all-women groups improves signifi-
cantly than when they are in mixed-gender groups. 15 2 While one may
argue that women simply do not like competition against men, we
need to ask why this is so. Perhaps, women seek to protect men from
feeling shame for letting "a girl beat them." Women know that if they
win they will face sanctions for threatening male notions of
masculinity.
The higher women climb in the tournament, the more "mascu-
line" the job is perceived-increasing the chances that supervisors will
not see women executives as suitable for that level of the game.
151
Research studies show that the smaller the women's percentage in a
tournament group, the more likely colleagues will devalue women's
contributions. 154 These studies also show that as women's token status
becomes salient, the more this status will affect her performance.
155
Specifically, studies show that token women in groups performed
twenty-one percent worse than women in the all-female groups.
156
Because people react negatively to women behaving in competi-
tive ways, women may internalize sanctions that they may accept the
imposter image-they accept the legitimacy of their own inferiority as
they reached levels that they are "not supposed to achieve."' 57 Wo-
men executives' sense that they are "faking it" increases as they win
more rounds of workplace contests. Rather than feeling she is a "spe-
cial person with a Midas touch," she may feel that she is a fraud who
will be exposed any day. In this way, we can see that women may have
151. Id. at 32.
152. Id. at 102.
153. Id. at 92-93.
154. Id. at 92.
155. Id. at 80.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 77-79.
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less of the sense of invincibility that superstars need to challenge col-
leagues in competitive environments.
b. The Behavioral Makeup of Women Superstars.-With respect to
women superstars, one may interpret research on gender differences
in quite different ways. On the one hand, one can see how women
executives' biases may promote more business integrity for three rea-
sons. In general, the notion is that women may have fewer of the
"white male traits" of "egocentrism" that use self-deception to justify
questionable behavior.15 First, women may not allow success to cloud
their judgments; they are less likely to think "everything is going to
work out all right." In addition, since women take less risk, they may
be less likely to engage in wrongdoing because they may see excessive
risk-taking as part of the game. In this way, women executives may
have an advantage over men who often overestimate their chances
and aim too high.1" 9 Finally, if women have more of an ethic of care,
they may be less able to alter their emotions in order to betray team
members to proceed to the next level of competition. Women may
worry more about what they leave behind-including fraudulent
actions. 60
On the other hand, these same behavioral tendencies of women
may operate to the detriment of corporations. Women executives
may manipulate gender performance to move up in the tournament
in ways that are not available to men. Under this view, women can be
just as high-Mach as men, but use three different means. First, with
respect to overconfidence, women executives may need larger egos
than men to succeed. To see why, we can envision high-powered wo-
men having bigger egos because they battle on additional fronts that
men do not face-in a more complex web of tournament matches at
home, work, and society.
Second, while men may use direct tactics for conflict, women ex-
ecutives may express anger and quests for domination beneath the
surface. Women's hidden aggression may give them greater ability
than men to fake loyalty to team members. Because women are as-
158. Grease and Grit, supra note 58, at 1628. According to Langevoort, "[W]hite males
might have a competitive advantage because of their comfort and familiarity with the lan-
guage and norms of workgroup interaction.... [W]hite males would have a continuing
advantage simply because of their primacy in setting the cultural norms and their numeri-
cal domination of the status quo." Id. at 1626.
159. BABcocK & LASCHEVER, supra note 87, at 136.
160. See id. at 118 (noting the greater importance women place on relationships);
O'Connor, supra note 6, at 1307-08 (stating that studies indicate that businesswomen may
possess a higher degree of moral development than male executives).
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sumed to have moral authority, they may appear to be congenial while
using relationships to inflict harm upon opponents.
Third, we can question how the tournament may alter the moral
values of women in a destructive manner because they must make
larger sacrifices to succeed. For women, we hope that "oppression in
a male hierarchy" may make them more insightful concerning "good
ole boy" cultures. Although women may be more likely to see how
male standards create ethical risks, the hardships faced may not im-
prove their personalities in ways assumed. Rather than ennobling, her
climb to the top may be an embittering experience that increases cog-
nitive biases. She may rationalize that the game is rigged against her
to begin with, so she is justified in taking more ethical short cuts than
men.
In sum, women who win the tournament may possess dexterity in
gender performance to keep their aggression and ego below the radar
screen in ways that do not offend men. This raises questions whether
many women executives have the caring values often attributed to
them.
B. Group Cognitive Biases and Women in the Boardroom
1. Social Psychology and Small Group Decisionmaking.-Corporate
law scholars use studies of small-group decisionmaking in social psy-
chology to evaluate the deliberative processes of boards.16 1 This liter-
ature suggests that boards make better decisions in groups than those
made by individuals.162 To explain these results, social psychologists
theorize that groups curb individual defects by presenting different
perspectives, awakening concentration, and fixing mistakes among
members.1 63
161. E.g., Cox & Munsinger, supra note 10, at 89; Lynne L. Dallas, Proposals for Reform of
Corporate Boards of Directors: The Dual Board and Board Ombudsperson, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
91, 93 (1997).
162. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 208 n.4, 209-10; cf
Jayne W. Barnard, Institutional Investors and the New Corporate Governance, 69 N.C. L. REv.
1135, 1170-73 (1991) (noting the finding of social scientists that changing the processes
used in group decisionmaking may improve the outcome).
163. E.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 162, at 209 n.5; RobertJ. Haft, Business Decision by the
New Board: Behavioral Science and Corporate Law, 80 MIcH. L. REV. 1, 9-14 (1981); see also
Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unin-
tended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 801-05 (2001) [here-
inafter Human Nature] (setting forth the importance of the board of directors providing
advice and bringing outside experience to bear in developing corporate strategy).
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Social psychology reveals that cognitive flaws affecting small
groups may impair boardroom politics. 164 Even if it was possible to
decrease the time and informational constraints facing independent
directors, these groups can suffer from behavioral defects similar to
those that affect individuals.165 Specifically, groups may be influenced
by psychological processes-group mindlessness-that may lead
boards to avoid seriously scrutinizing managerial policy. Indeed,
when several factors come together, they can multiply group biases so
that the effect is much greater than simply adding the factors to-
gether.166 Remember, however, that "contagious bias 1 67 may help in
making routine decisions and does not always lead to faulty results. In
addition, just because a group fails does not mean that it was the re-
sult of defective decisionmaking. Finally, within the same group,
group biases may influence one decision, but not others. 16 8
Because CEOs dominate the boards,169 many boards do not con-
sist of equal-status peers that have impartial leadership. Cognitive bi-
ases arise in independent directors' perceptions that are influenced
by the CEO, who still effectively chooses those directors.17 ° In gen-
eral, social psychology indicates that independent directors are likely
to feel loyalty to their appointer."' Social psychology warns that
members of a group tend to conform their opinions to what they per-
164. Donald Langevoort explains that we should not "expect people to respond fully to
legal rules that ask them to modify their actions upon spotting danger signs, when perceiv-
ing such signs would provoke the stress of an ego threat." Langevoort, Ego, supra note 8, at
869. Shaming may be an ineffective tool because independent directors may not recognize
the wrongfulness of their behavior because cognitive processes minimize the effect of ego-
threatening information. Id at 856-58.
165. See generally Christopher P. Neck & Gregory Moorhead, Groupthink Remodeled: The
Importance of Leadership, Time Pressure, and Methodical Decision-Making Procedures, 48 HUM.
REL. 537 (1995) (discussing "groupthink" which can result in individuals within a group
seeking consensus to such a degree that alternative courses of action are ignored and the
wrong decision arrived at).
166. Cox & Munsinger, supra note 10, at 104.
167. Donald C. Langevoort, The Epistemology of Corporate-Securities Lawyering: Beliefs, Biases
and Organizational Behavior, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 629, 647 (1997) [hereinafter Epistemology].
168. IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK 14, 132 (2d ed., rev. 1983). As an example, Janis re-
ferred to how groupthink influenced President Kennedy's inner circle of advisors in for-
mulating strategic plans leading to the Bay of Pigs, whereas the members avoided the same
errors when deliberating the Cuban Missile Crisis. Id.
169. For a further explanation of directors' schema, see Epistemology, supra note 167, at
676 (discussing the role of attorneys in managing the various tendencies of directors).
170. See Cox & Munsinger, supra note 10, at 98-99 (discussing the CEO's role in select-
ing board members and how this affects group conformity).
171. For analysis of how directors' schemas develop from insiders' perspectives, see Epis-
temology, supra note 167, at 630-36.
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ceive the leader of the group wants to hear. 7 2 In this way, indepen-
dent directors may lose their outsider perspective.' 73
Moreover, individual members of a group may adjust their behav-
ior in response to their impressions of other group members. Under
these group biases,17 4 boards may make riskier decisions than those
made by individuals alone.' 75 Specifically, there is a strong tendency
of like-minded people deliberating in groups to move toward extreme
consequences. That is, group biases may foster over-optimism, lack of
vigilance, and sloganistic thinking. In this way, small groups may
come to believe that their goals are based on ethical principles in a
way that allows them to avoid questioning the honesty of their
behavior.
2. Groupthink in the Boardroom.-One of the most studied behav-
ioral biases in small group decisionmaking is groupthink. The creator
of this theory, IrvingJanis, describes groupthink as "a mode of think-
ing that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive
in-group, when the members' striving for unanimity override their
172. Haft, supra note 163, at 41-42; see also Human Nature, supra note 163, at 797.
173. See Epistemology, supra note 167, at 637-38 (discussing the potential of attorneys to
blend into and thereby become influenced by the prevailing corporate culture).
174. Rather than moving toward the center of group opinion, under a process called
polarization," groups may make riskier decisions than those made by individuals acting
alone. Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 74
(2000). This involves a process whereby an entire group quickly comes to share a view
because some people in the group appear to accept the belief. Id. at 74. Group conform-
ity does not provide the whole answer because individuals' private opinion also changed to
favor the riskier positions. Id. at 74-75. The group may find positions based on rhetoric
currently favored in the culture to be more significant or "persuasive arguments." Id. at 89.
People like to maintain certain self-perceptions, thus if an individual likes to think of him-
self as more risk prone than average, he may shift his position to favor even more risk after
hearing the other members. Id. at 87. The most vocal members may act as "risk entrepre-
neurs," leading to a limited argument pool whereby there are many arguments in favor of a
risky project and few against. In a masculine environment, individual members may want
to hold themselves out to others as people who are not afraid to take risk.
Under a process called "cascades," there may be a snowballing effect. Id. at 82. Mem-
bers of a group come to share a more extreme view in a cascade-like process, reaching a
"tipping" point where group consensus forms. Id Similar to polarization, cascades occur
for information and reputation reasons. Id. at 81. Specifically, these cascades occur be-
cause members may publicly take a stand or remain silent in order to maintain their repu-
tations with other members of the group, although their private perceptions may vary. Id.
at 83. Thus, directors may concur with initial opinions expressed to aid in maintaining the
self-esteem of the original speaker.
175. E.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry
into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 395 (1981); Dallas, supra note
161, at 107; Sunstein, supra note 174, at 75.
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motivations to realistically appraise alternative courses of action."1 7 6
Although Janis's groupthink hypothesis is well-accepted in the field of
social psychology, empirical tests have produced mixed results as to
the theory's validity.177 Many of the conditions, such as cohesiveness,
are hard to replicate in laboratory settings.
Cohesiveness, a common trait in boards, is one of the most im-
portant precedents for groupthink. It is important to note that cohe-
siveness 7' is one of the most controversial topics in social psychology.
Janis's characterization of harmful cohesiveness is similar to the warm
"clubby atmosphere" on boards." 9 Too much camaraderie can lead
groups to avoid facing hard questions. Specifically, "fictive friend-
ships"80 may create boardroom norms that interpret directors' criti-
cism of the CEO as disloyalty. Board members know that
renomination to the board depends on "appropriate performance,"
which means they need to conform their behavior to the "cult of po-
liteness." These pressures lead some directors to use least-effort solu-
tions, rather than criticize corporate strategies.
According to Janis, when the group is faced with ethically ques-
tionable decisions, groupthink leads members to avoid doubt about
the appropriateness of their actions. Viewed in this light, groupthink
is a defensive mode for groups coping with decisional stress. Mem-
bers use group concurrence to ease anxieties aroused from violating
ethical standards. 18 ' They avoid feelings of shame and guilt 1 2 by ra-
tionalizing "we are a good and wise group."183 In addition, successful
groups may succumb to the winner's curse when group narcissism and
unlimited confidence prevail. This may lead to excessive risk-taking
because members unconsciously generate shared illusions of superior-
176. JANIS, supra note 168, at 9. Janis developed the groupthink theory by examining
how small, high-level groups of government officials used faulty decisionmaking proce-
dures that resulted in bad results-specifically analyzing Pearl Harbor, the Korean War,
the Bay of Pigs, and the Vietnam War. Id. at vii-x.
177. See, e.g., Marceline B.R. Koorn et al., Managing Group Decision Making Processes: Indi-
vidual Versus Collective Accountability and Groupthink, 2 INT'L. J. CONFLICT MGMT. 91 (1991).
178. JANIS, supra note 168, at 245.
179. Id. at 247.
180. O'Connor, supra note 6, at 1246.
181. JANIS, supra note 168, at 250-54. For these reasons, members avoid raising ethical
concerns that imply that a "fine group .... with its humanitarianism and its high-minded
principles, might be capable of adopting a course of action that is inhumane and im-
moral." Id. at 12.
182. Ronald R. Sims, Linking Groupthink to Unethical Behavior in Organizations, 11 J. Bus.
ETHiCs 651, 653-54 (1992).
183. JANIS, supra note 168, at 256.
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ity that hinder critical reflection and reality testing.'84 The group sur-
mises "we needn't worry, everything will go our way." '185
In order for groupthink to develop, Janis maintains that group
members engage in self-censorship to repress dissent. Specifically,
Janis states: "When groupthink tendencies become dominant, the
members . . . try to avoid saying anything that might disturb the
smooth surface of unanimity that enables the members to feel confi-
dent that their policies are correct and are bound to succeed. '18 6
Members may criticize dissenters for being "soft" on risk-taking; the
objector may receive subtle ridicule and rebuff for asking too many
questions.1 7 Thus, directors may detect "which way the wind is blow-
ing,"1 8 and will "put up and shut up" in order to advance their
careers.
Viewed in this light, we can see that corporate governance re-
forms may result in corporate lawyers leaving behind even more ex-
tensive paper trails to document compliance with hollow rituals.
These reforms can only provide independent directors with the
"power to act,"'8 9 but do not assure that they have the "will" to act.'9 °
This perspective explains why many boards have learned to go
through the motions of good corporate procedures, but nevertheless
continue to fail to challenge managers when necessary. In the end,
we need directors who are bold and courageous enough to say that
the emperor CEO has no clothes.
3. Women's Ability to Prevent Groupthink on Corporate Boards.-
a. Women Joining the Corporate Elite.-We should consider
how group behavioral biases may affect women to a greater degree
than men. Specifically, this Article posits that women directors may
be less likely than men to "rock the boat" because they face more criti-
cism for dissenting because of their gender.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 95.
187. See id. at 39-40 (noting why doubts about the CIA invasion of Cuba were not
pressed). Most people do not want to risk embarrassment by displaying their ignorance in
public. Selling Hope, Selling Risk, supra note 140, at 657.
188. Haft, supra note 163, at 38.
189. Shann Turnbull, Crumbling Corporate Governance Myths, CoRP. LIBRARv, Sept. 5, 2002,
http://www.thecorporatelibrary.com/special/turnbull/turnbulllO.html. Thus, boards in-
crease the form, but not substance on important issues such as executive pay. Millstein,
supra note 52, at 19.
190. See Turnbull, supra note 189.
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Studies of the "small world of the corporate elite" '191 are pessimis-
tic about the progress made in promoting outsider values on corpo-
rate boards.1 92 This cynicism arises because "directors who represent
diversity on corporate boards share the same values as the old, homo-
geneous groups."' 93 Given that women and men are trained to think
as corporate members, they will have similar ethical perspectives to
laser focus on bottom-line goals. Perhaps, directors representing di-
versity learn to assure incumbent boards that they will "fit in" and not
cause trouble. Thus, some corporate scholars posit that the power
elite produces a facade of diversity by selecting women and minorities
who share the same values as the existing CEOs. 194
b. Women's Fear of Speaking Up.-In evaluating women directors,
we need to recognize that the cultural cohesiveness on corporate
boards can create a large hurdle for people who are "not like
them."9 ' The "fictive friendships" that prevail among white men on
boards make it more difficult for women to become part of the "good
ole boys' club."196 Women may have had to internalize the required
personality changes to fit in to a greater degree than men in order to
become a rubber-stamped member of the "elite private club."
Because women professionals may lack self-confidence, they may
engage in more self-censorship in corporate boardrooms. Specifi-
cally, studies of small group decisionmaking reveal that women may
be more likely to second guess their opinions, suppress doubts, and
couch opinions in a tentative manner.19 7 For this reason, women
speak less in mixed-gender groups, that is, they take fewer turns in the
conversation and take less time in each turn.198 In analyzing women
directors' roles in boardrooms, one may argue that women's contribu-
tions may be treated with less attention and respect than those of their
191. Mina Yoo et al., The Small World of the Corporate Elite, DIREcTORsHIP, Nov. 2001, at 4,
4-5 (finding that, based on an analysis of boards and directors of the largest U.S. corpora-
tions in 1999, each director, on average, could reach every other director through 4.6
intermediators and each board through 3.7).
192. O'Connor, supra note 6, at 1309-10.
193. Id. at 1310.
194. Id.; accord RIcHARD L. ZWEIGENHAFT & G. WILLIAM DOMHOFF, DIVERSITY IN THE
POWER ELITE: Have Women and Minorities Reached the Top? 192 (1998).
195. Cox & Munsinger, supra note 10, at 105-08.
196. For a general discussion of these "fictive friendships" among board members, see
O'Connor, supra note 6, at 1246.
197. Cf Lawyers'Responsibility, supra note 145, at 105 (noting this tendency in groups of
lawyers).
198. See DEBORAH TANNEN, You JusT DON'T UNDERSTAND: WOMEN AND MEN IN CONVER-
SATION 87-88 (1990).
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male colleagues. Thus, women executives who rise to directors posi-
tions do not have the same degree of power as male board members.
Even if women executives have a greater ethic of care than men,
the tendency to "go along to get along" may be more deeply ingrained
in women directors. Specifically, in order to avoid a "relationship-
threatening act of defiance,"' 9 women executives may accept expla-
nations at face value without making efforts to investigate statements.
They may downplay red flags to avoid criticism for being "unmascu-
line"-feminine idealists.2 °° Even if women directors soft pedal disa-
greement, they may face subtle criticism in the form of collegial jokes
made at their expense. In addition, having a directorship may mean
more status to a woman according to her own self-image, and that
received by her peers, because there are so few women who have ob-
tained this prize. For this reason, women may be more subject to con-
sensus pressure than those firmly in the club. Viewed in this light,
women may be even more yes-men than men.20'
This Article questions the notion that women have cornered the
market on integrity in business. We need to recognize that society
often deals with harshness of the "heartless world of the marketplace"
by giving women new ideological significance as saintly figures who
uphold morality. This view attributes women with symbolic meaning
that glorifies the mother as the heart and soul of the family.20 2 In
other words, women are perceived as "angels in the earth" creating a
haven from the increasing competition of the marketplace. 20 3 Thus,
using the authority of the "moral mother" to promote women execu-
tives is likely to reinforce traditional gender roles. 204 This Article
maintains that rather than relying on this window dressing, we need to
199. See Selling Hope, Selling Risk, supra note 140, at 684.
200. SeeJANs, supra note 168, at 114-15 (discussing this type of pressure within theJohn-
son administration).
201. Cf Canice Prendergast, A Theory of "Yes Men,"83 AM. ECON. REv. 757, 769 (1993)
(noting employees rewarded on a subjective basis may become more likely to tell supervi-
sors what they want to hear).
202. In a paradoxical manner, although women are also breadwinners, mothering
norms have intensified in the new economy.
203. To promote the notion of the moral mother in times of economic change, tradi-
tionalists may blame working women as contributing to societal problems involving fami-
lies and children. For this reason, some gender scholars posit that corporations may find it
more acceptable to punish women at work because they may be spending less time on the
homefront caring for family members.
204. O'Connor-Felman, supra note 88, at 1274. While the ethic of care may have a place
in certain corporate contexts and societal transformation, we need to use this view cau-
tiously so women do not perform this caring role at their own expense and aspirations. To
climb the corporate ladder, women executives need to learn that self-assertion is not self-
ish. Id.
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fine tune gender analysis to understand the more complex dynamics
that influence women in high-powered positions.
CONCLUSION: THE TOURNAMENT AS A REFLECTION OF OUR
NARCISSISTIC SOCIETY
Although this Article analyzes many aspects of gender and corpo-
rate cultures, we must keep in mind that this is only a portion of the
picture. 20 5 One of the most significant barriers to the advancement of
women executives is that they make more personal sacrifices in terms
of marriage and children than their male counterparts.2 °6 Societal
demands concerning work and family norms restrict women's ability
to compete in the tournament and force women to make harsh
"choices" on a daily basis.
205. See, e.g., id. at 1267-70.
206. The glass ceiling consists of many varied and pervasive forms of gender bias that
occur in both overt and covert ways. One of the most significant barriers is the difficulty of
balancing the demands of the workplace with caring burdens at home. CATALYST INC.,
supra note 40, at 37. Catalyst's 1996 study was the "first large-scale research study of women
who have made it to senior management in the nation's largest companies." Id. at 4. This
study reported that seventy-two percent of these women were married; sixty-four percent
had children; eighty-seven percent were part of career couples; that married women con-
tributed an average of sixty-eight percent of their household income; and three-quarters
provided "over half of the total household income, making them the primary 'breadwin-
ners' of the family." Id. at 9.
In Creating a Life: Professional Women and the Quest for Children, the economist Sylvia
Ann Hewlett reports that "the more successful the woman, the less likely it is she will find a
husband or bear a child." SYLvA ANN HEWLETT, CREATING A LIFE: PROFESSIONAL WOMEN
AND THE QUEST FOR CHILDREN 41 (2002). Women sacrifice much more in terms of rela-
tionships and general quality of life to keep up with men in the business world. For in-
stance, Hewlett notes that only fifty-seven percent of high-powered women were married
compared with eighty-three percent of the men. Id. at 87-88. These women are more
likely to be divorced than similarly situated men (eighteen percent compared to twelve
percent). In contrast to the dim numbers for high-powered women, sixty-one percent of
men in the corporate elite have stay-at-home wives. Id. at 103. "Only 39 percent of high-
achieving men are married to women who are employed full time, and 40 percent of these
earn less than $35,000 a year." Id.
Hewlett suggests that the disparate numbers pertaining to family life between men
and women in high-powered positions stems from the fact that high-flying men do not
want to marry their counterparts. Id. at 170. Hewlett suggests three possible reasons for
this phenomena: (1) they would have no time for each other because of the high pressure
they are under, (2) the man's earning power would not be appreciated as much, (3) men
want a wife who will support them and not vice-versa. Id. at 178. In other words, they want
a nurturer, not a predator as a wife; Hewlett surmises that it may be harder for women to
be predators at work and nurturers at home. Id. at 172-76. This is a harsh sacrifice for
these women because, as Hewlett demonstrates, the pressures of work/family stress can
strain marriages to the breaking point. Id. at 183. Hewlett reveals that it is difficult to find
spouses capable of living with accomplished women and thus women's chances of finding
spouses decrease with age, while men's prospects in finding younger wives rise. Id. at 169-
71.
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To fully understand the issues pertaining to how corporate cul-
tures influence men and women, we need to examine the broader
context of the role of tournaments in our society. Specifically, tourna-
ments reflect that the United States is in an economic transition to the
new economy at the same time that it is undergoing a social revolu-
tion in gender roles. Under this economic reform, corporations have
sought to promote more flexible labor markets in response to stock
market pressure to increase shareholder value. Tournaments restruc-
ture the social contract with employees to shift more risk onto work-
ers, resulting in longer working hours, greater workplace demands,
less job security, and stagnating wages.
Occurring simultaneously with this economic transition, the wo-
men's movement has spurred dramatic change in gender roles as wo-
men reject their traditional role in providing domestic services and
have entered the labor force on a larger scale. As a result, in less than
the span of a human lifetime, women's roles have changed more than
in all of history. Although the shift in the gender composition of the
labor force evolved independently of globalization, these two phe-
nomena intersect and interact to magnify the forces reshaping the
connections between family, work, and corporation. Using this wide-
angled framework, this Article asserts that tournament structures mag-
nify and accelerate socio-economic development and, in turn, will be
influenced by such socio-economic development.
Researching tournament structures not only allows us to learn
about the society we live in and the dynamics of corporate cultures, it
offers an occasion to learn about ourselves. Specifically, we can see
that the pressures of the tournament promote narcissism-a promi-
nent feature of the winner-take-all society. Under this narcissist soci-
ety, the tournament is a symbol of egocentricity as well as an allegory
about the loss of individuality.2 "7 The tournament promotes a gladia-
tor mentality, whereby many executives work long hours for more
than just the money. Rather, the greatest incentive to win the tourna-
ment may be ego-knowing that they defeated opponents to become
major players. 20 8
These survival-of-the-fittest competitions drive executives by the
thrill of the race and the fear of losing; they begin to think that only
time spent in an instrumental way has value-to the detriment of what
else life offers. Specifically, in order to "do what it takes to succeed,"
executives may devote more energy to winning the game than they do
207. O'Connor, supra note 6, at 1314.
208. Id.
MARYLAND LAw REViEW
for what once might have mattered most in their lives-family and
friends. In the male-dominated world of corporations, however, many
employees desire to work less and spend more time with their fami-
lies, even if this entails less compensation.2 09 In this way, serious ques-
tions arise whether the tournament society contributes to personal
and societal well-being.
The hope is that our daughters will increase the number of wo-
men who will ascend to upper-level management. We can ask what
the everyday life of today's high-powered mothers tells our daughters.
Our daughters have grown up in a new world-they were raised by
high-powered mothers who are arguably the most liberated and privi-
leged group of women ever seen. These women, however, have a
strong sense of betrayal because they were raised with hopes that they
could "have it all," only to find they are running on exhausting tread-
mills. Our daughters will face even more demands from the "don't
look down" society. Specifically, we can expect greater pressures from
the 24/7 workplace, family balance, the second shift, daycare, no-fault
divorce, and the glass ceiling. We need to ask how we can improve
tournament structures for our daughters and sons who will enter the
workforce in a few years.
Although simple solutions will not work, some large firms are
making progress by studying workplace norms using outside consul-
tants, such as Catalyst, to organize employees in small groups to iden-
tify gender barriers and remove stereotypes.210 Although efforts to
reshape corporate cultures are significant, widespread societal
changes in individual notions about gender norms and tournament
structures are required.
Untangling and clarifying the connections between gender,
power, and ego in the corporate context is a difficult task. Given that
corporate law scholars have not traditionally incorporated gender per-
spectives, it is hoped that they will listen and learn to approach these
topics with new eyes and fresh opinions. 211 In this way, corporate law
209. See Amy L. Wax, Family-Fnendly Workplace Reform: Prospects for Change, 596 ANNALS
AM. AcAD. OF POL. & Soc. Sci. 36, 46 (2004).
210. Sturm, Employment Discrimination, supra note 3, at 524-27. For literature discussing
how training programs for directors should focus on diversity to overcome biases that di-
rectors may have in working with people who are "different," see Human Nature, supra note
163, at 800.
211. As scholars studying tournaments, we can question whether we may succumb to the
distinct patterns of cognitive faults in the tournament of academia. Since tight-knit groups
form, we may inquire whether groupthink tendencies may emerge within many areas of
study-including corporate law. Corporate law scholarship is a world dominated mostly by
white men who tend to be politically conservative-using law and economics to uphold the
status quo. Analogizing to our understanding of corporate boards, we may ask whether the
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scholars can offer significant perspectives about the accountability for
some of the major levers of societal power-the largest corporations
of the world.
participation in this cohesive community of researchers may lead to an atmosphere that
restricts genuine opinion because the room for discussion is so narrow. Specifically, as
corporate scholars we may lose contact with parts of ourselves because the tournament for
scholarship silences individual voice. In the dominating drive to acquire positions at the
most prestigious law schools, we may tailor our publications in a manner that will lead to
more points in the game.
With this new field of research, we have an opportunity to break free of these behav-
ioral tendencies. To begin the study of gender and corporate law, scholars need to ex-
amine their own entrenched attitudes about men, women, and the workplace. Rather than
playing this game of intellectual chess, we need to let our egos fade to work collectively as
problem-solvers to build organizational structures, brick by brick, that will promote individ-
ual, organizational, and societal well-being.
